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I n order to put my thoughts in context, I begin by outlining recent Canadian participation in the international sphere. I want to highlight that Canadian 
Forces operations are not limited to "peacekeeping" as is often misunderstood, not 
only on the international scene, but also sometimes at home. While Canada chose 
not to be involved in the 2003 Iraq operation, it has been a fully committed member-
in terms both of the lives of its soldiers, sailors and ainnen, including women, as 
well as of "national treasure" - in the coalition and international efforts related to 
what the United States, our dose neighbor to the south, has termed the "Global 
War on Terror" or the "GWOT," and what we call the "Campaign Against Terror-
ism" or the "CAT."l I suppose this subtle use of different terminology is part of 
the reason this volume contains two other articles2 authored by represen tatives of 
nations that have participated in coalition operations with the United States. To-
gether they illustrate the differing national approaches and understandings relat-
ing to participation in a common enterprise. 
Regardless of how the conflict is termed. countering AI Qaeda requires a 
multidisciplinary and multifaceted approach involving civilian and military intel-
ligence agencies. policing. diplomacy and international engagement. as well as the 
.. Brigadier General. Canadian Forces. The opinions expressed in th is article are solely those of 
the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the government of Canada. 
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use of military forces. The use of military forces encompasses both domestic and 
international operations. In this regard it should be noted that Canada does not 
have the equivalent of the US Posse Comitatus Act.} Canadian military forces-naval, 
land and air---<an be deployed to provide a wide variety of assistance to law en-
forcement operations, both within Canada and off our shores.4 
There has been significant debate about how to characterize the conflicts against 
non-State actors, such as AI Qaeda, other terrorist groups and insurgent forces. This 
includes categorizing such conflicts as being "not of an international character,"S 
"international armed conflicts"6 and "internationalized internal armed conflicts." 
From time to time the term "transnational" armed conflict has even crept into aca-
demic literature.' The Canadian approach has been that at a minimum Common 
Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions8 applies to operations in Afghanistan. 
Canada, however, has avoided categorizing the transnational operations of AI 
Qaeda, preferring to simply acknowledge that an "armed conflict" is in existence to 
which humanitarian law applies regardless of whether operations occur on land, in the 
air or on the high seas.9 Remember, however, that the famous Caroline case outlining 
the basis for self-defense for States under international law involved the transborder 
activities of a non-State actor against Canada. lo 
Of course "war" is such an emotive term, particularly fo r international lawyers 
who may have viewed the creation of the United Nations Charter as an end of 
"war" in any legal sense. In fact ual terms, "war" very much continues to exist and 
the conduct of "warfare" is what engages professional military forces, international 
humanitarian law treaties and customary international law. As has been noted by 
one Canadian academic institute, 95 percent of contemporary conflicts are "inter-
nal" to States. 11 As warfare changes from the industrial age to the information age 
and perhaps fo urth-generation warfare, contemporary military operations have, as 
the British General Sir Rupert Smith has noted, become the conduct of "war 
amongst the people. "12 This trend away from the traditional idea of warfare being 
"international armed conflict" between nation-States is presenting significant 
challenges not only for us as military law practitioners, but also for our academic 
colleagues and for essential stakeholders such as the International Committee of 
the Red Cross (JCRe) and committed h uman rights non-governmental organiza-
tions. It may be fair to say that the effort in the post-World War II era to restrict the 
recourse to war by States (jus ad bellum) means the rich body of conventional and 
customary law (jus in bello) technically applies to its fullest extent to a significantly 
decreasing type of conflict. J know the JCRe's 2005 Customary International Hu-
manitariatl Law study]} has garnered criticism from a variety of sources regarding 
its methodology and some of its conclusions. 14 Indeed, there are parts of the study 
with which J disagree;IS however, it remains a significant and, in many ways, a 
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courageous undertaking at an essential time as operations appear to shift from a fo-
cus on international armed conflict to counterinsurgency. I keep a copy of the 
study close to my desk and it is used regularly by Canadian Forces legal officers as 
an important resource tool. 
Since October 24, 200 1 when Canada acted "in the exercise of the inherent right 
of individual and collective self defence in accordance with Article 51» of the 
United Nations Charter in response to the armed attacks on the United States, 
Canada has been a steadfast participant in conducting military operations against 
the threats posed by AI Qaeda and the Taliban. 16 With our joint enterprise in the 
North American Aerospace Defense Command, Canada and the United States 
have worked in an integrated fashion to protect the skies over North America. 
Canadian participation has seen the deployment of a significant portion of our 
navy to the US Cen tral Command's maritime area of responsibility, including as 
part of US Navy carrier strike groups and maritime patrol aircraft operations in 
the Persian Gulf. We have also provided tactical airlift , infantry, special forces 
and other units to coalition and International Security Assistance Force opera-
tions since the beginning of operations in Afghanistan, including the participa-
tion of an in fantry battle group in Operation Anaconda in 2002. Canada 
presently has approximately 2,300 personnel operating in Regional Command 
(South) centered on Kandahar. These include an infantry battle group, co mbat 
engineers, artillery, Leopard tanks, armored reconnaissance, an unmanned aerial 
vehicle unit and operational mentor liaison teams working with the Afghanistan 
army. A Canadian legal officer was deployed to work with our American col-
leagues in the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan mentoring 
program in respect to the Afghan justice system. Further, another legal officer 
will deploy shortly to the Canadian Operational Mentoring Liaison Team 
mentoring the Afghan 205 Corps. 
The cost of the mission has been high from a Canadian perspective. Fifty-seven 
personnel, including our first female combat casualty (an artillery officer), have 
been killed mostly in the last eighteen months. In addition, a Canadian Foreign Af-
fairs officer was killed by an improvised explosive device. Over two hundred per-
sonnel have been wounded. As can be expected, the involvement of Canadian 
Forces personnel in Afghanistan has caused considerable political and national de-
bate. For example, the vote in Parliament in May 2006 to extend the mission in Af-
ghanistan until February 2009 was 149 to 145 in favor of the extensionY 
The operations in Afghanistan reflect a larger challenge facing all our nations, 
that being the changing nature of warfare. The challenges presented by "counterin-
surgency" warfare include, inter alia, the treatment of detainees, the application of 
human rights norms, and targeting and resulting limitations on collateral damage. 
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Historically, there are two legal issues that present themselves as "centers of grav-
ity" impacting on the ability of democracies to wage military campaigns against in-
surgent forces. They are the issue of the treatment of detainees-and, more 
specifically, the question of torture-and excessive injury and death to civilians 
(collateral damage). The present campaign is no exception. 
As an officer serving for a country that has signed Additional Protocol I (AP 1),18 
you might expect that 1 would indicate that treaty is a reason for differing ap-
proaches to the conduct of coalition operations with non-party countries such as 
the United States; however, it is hard to make that case. Some 85 percent of the 
world's States have signed and ratified AP I and many of its provisions are accepted 
as either customary international law or as a doctrinal basis for the conduct of op-
erations. In other words, a general acceptance of AP I provisions is a matter of 
"fact." The AP I provisions are integrated into the training and doctrine of Cana-
dian Forces personnel and their involvement in non-AP I conflicts is not likely to 
fundamentally change the way wars are fought. That is likely the case of other 
NATO countries who are AP I countries. The most obvious example of this is the 
widespread acceptance of the AP I, Article 57 precautionary measures and the 
principle of "proportionality" in respect to targeting. 
There are different legal obligations and interpretations of the law for Canadian 
personnel than for American forces. An example is the 1997 Ottawa Convention 
on anti-personnel mines. 19 That Convention clearly prohibits the use, develop-
ment, production, stockpiling, retention or transfer of anti-personnel mines, as 
well as assisting, encouraging or inducing such activities. Canadian Forces per-
sonnel have specific direction setting out their obligations when they operate with 
nations who are not parties to the Convention. We may not use anti-personnel mines 
and cannot request, directly or indirectly, the protection of those mines. However, 
Canadian Forces personnel can participate in combined operations with non-
Convention States. There appear to have been no stumbling blocks, likely because 
of a general lack of use of such mines in contemporary operations; the relatively 
large nwnber of countries, including within NATO, who have ratified the Conven-
tion; and the general awareness by our personnel of their obligations.2o 
It is simply a fact of coalition operations that nations will often take different ap-
proaches to interpreting the law. For example, my experience has been that European 
nations are more directly impacted by the human rights framework associated with 
decisions of the European Court of Human Rights than non-European countries, 
such as Canada and the United States. Further, from time to time we must deal 
with the different way that civil-law-trained and common law lawyers look at a 
problem. Again, my experience has been that civil law lawyers will usually ap-
proach a problem first from the context of the treaty law provisions, while common 
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law lawyers read "black letter" law in the context of case law and customary intema-
tionallaw. Although the approach can be different, we often end up at the same place. 
There can also be differences with countries with similar legal systems, although not 
as many differences as may be the perceived wisdom. For example, the US interpreta-
tion of "military objective," to the extent that it includes an enemy's "war sustaining 
capability," is broader than that of most States, including Canada. However, it should 
also be noted that Canada entered a reservation to Additional Protocol I that states, 
" [T]he military advantage anticipated from an attack is intended to refer to theadvan-
tage anticipated from the attack considered as a whole and not from isolated or partic-
ular parts of the attack." From a Canadian perspective, targets would not be limited to 
military forces and could include strategic targets such as rail yards, electric power 
grids, oil refineries, lines of communication, bridges and supply routes. To the extent, 
however, that the US wording would include attacks on exports that may be the source 
of financial resources for a belligerent, it could very well present, as Professor Oinstein 
has noted, "a slippery slope" in which every economic activity might be considered as 
indirectly sustaining the war effort.2l It is likcly in this context during a traditional in-
ternational armed conflict that Canadian and American approaches would differ.22 
A greater challenge in contemporary operations is detennining the role and desired 
effect of the strategic use of airpower. Comparing the 1991 Gulf conflict and the 2003 
Iraq invasion, it would appear that a purely «strategic" approach had curried less favor 
in the overall planning of the latter campaign.2) It is a more significant issue when one 
considers how strategic strikes would realistically impact on a non-State-actor enemy. 
A problem with the application of strategic airpower is that in practice it appears not to 
have lived up to the hopes of its most ardent proponents. It is even less likely to have a 
significant impact during "small wars." 
As is noted by James Corum and Wray Johnson, the most effective use of airpower 
in opposing insurgents and terrorists conducting a low-level guerrilla war is the use of 
"indirect" means such as reconnaissance and transport.24 Issues related to bombing--
even with a tactical focus-can raise more profound and challenging questions: 
In much of the world, terrorism is seen as the unique weapon of the poor and fanatic; 
airpower is seen as the symbolic weapon of the West- the means by which the wealthy 
and advanced countries can bully the poor and weak countries. ThUs, bombing is 
automatically viewed in the Third World as cruel and heavy-handed. This creates a 
paradox that policymakers today do not seem willing to address. While airpower is 
often the most effective means to strike at insurgents and terrorists, its use will 
immediately provoke outcry and protest in many quarters of Western society and 
throughout most of the Third World In short, there is a political price to pay.2S 
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As Corum and Johnson state, "Bombing civilians, or targeting insurgents and terror-
ists in urban areas with resulting civilian casualties, generally works to the propaganda 
advantage of the rebels. "26 
The issue of "collateral damage" is as important in Afghanistan as it is in Iraq. The 
Afghan government has increasingly expressed concern over both civilian deaths and 
the manner in which searches are conductedF NATO itself has recognized the issue of 
collateral damage as one of the most important ones it faces28 and Jane's has recently 
concluded that continued civilian casualties will increasingly impact on Afghan sup-
port for international forces. 29 The question remains as to how members of a coalition 
measure collateral damage and ultimately the emphasis that is to be placed on the 
"right to life" of uninvolved civilians. This, in tum, raises fundamental questions re-
garding the applicability of human rights nonns in the interpretation of international 
humanitarian law. 
From a legal perspective, resolving the interface between the law governing armed 
conflict and human rights law may be the most significant challenge facing operational 
lawyers of all our nations. We are trained and schooled in State-on-State conflict and 
struggle over issues such as how collateral damage is to be assessed when it results from 
the reverberating or "knock on" effects of attacks against electrical grids. In the three-
block wars,JO occupations and other complex security situations of the twenty-first 
centwy, military forces are confronted with fighting dangerous, perfidious and ex-
ceedingly violent armed groups, while at the same time interfacing with a civilian pop-
ulation who may oppose or support the insurgent fo rces. This raises questions of 
whether assessments of collateral damage under these circumstances are impacted by 
the human rightsllaw enforcement notions of "capture rather than kill" and a more 
strict assessment of proportionality that demands operations be "planned and con-
ducted in such a way as to avoid or minimise, to the greatest extent possible, any risk to 
the lives of the [civilians[ ."31 
While there has been no definitive artirulation of the degree to which human rights 
law impacts on Canadian Forces international operations, it is d ear that the Interna-
tional Court of Justice in the Nuclear Weapotls32 and WalP3 cases have determined that 
human rights law continues to operate during armed conflict, subject to the applica-
tion of humanitarian law as a lex specialis. Further, it is unlikely that the Canadian posi-
tion would ignore Comment No. 31 of the United Nations Human Rights Committee, 
which, while not binding as a matter oflaw, would be persuasive.34 That Comment in-
dicates that the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)35 
would apply in situations where "the rules of international humanitarian law are 
applicable.")6 
While the Canadian approach to accepting whether human rights norms can 
apply to international operations may be different than that of the United States, 
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the practical effect is likely the same, particularly when the lex specialis of the laws 
governing anned conflict is applied. Canada has accepted the application of human 
rights-based norms regarding the treatment of detainees reflected in Common Ar-
ticle 3 of the Geneva Conventions and Article 7S of Additional Protocol I (which it-
self reflects the ICCPR norms). This approach would appear to resonate with that 
taken by the US Supreme Court in Hamdan. 37 
More difficult and pressing questions for many of our military forces regarding 
the application of human rights norms relate to the extraterritorial reach of domes-
tic courts and what, if any, impact those norms may have on the use offorce. Many 
Western nations are confronted with litigation regarding the extraterritorial applica-
tion of human rights (or civil rights) to matters relating to armed conflict. This can 
occur for a number of reasons, including the complex nature of the campaigns 
against terrorism and non-State entities, and the relative weakness of accountabil-
ity frameworks under humanitarian law in comparison to human rights law. The 
impact of "globalization" cannot be discounted; we live and fight in a far more in-
terconnected world that is breaking down previous boundaries. This may simply 
be one more casualty of the information age. 
Domestic courts in the United Kingdom and the European Court of Human 
Rights have struggled with this issue. Canada is no exception. Presently, there is li t-
igation in our Federal Court commenced by Amnesty International Canada and a 
provincial civil liberties association challenging the transfer of detainees taken in 
Afghanistan to Afghan authorities on the basis of a claim that they are subjected to 
torture. The application is not only focused on the Afghan treatment of detainees 
but also states that" [t Jhere are also substantial grounds to believe that the United 
States of America is engaged in cruel, degrading and inhuman treatment of detain-
ees, including torture, which is contrary to assurances the US has given to other 
governments, including Canada."38 The applicants are relying not only on interna-
tional law, but also claim that Canada's domestic Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
applies to the transfer of detainees outside of Canada in other countries. I will not 
say anything further as the matter is before the courts, but this is yet another indi-
cation of how human rights claims, induding domestic law, has the potential to 
impact on contemporary operations. 
As I have already indicated, the reach and effect of human rights norms are not 
limited to the issue of the handling of detainees. This is evidenced in the recent Israeli 
Supreme Court, sitting as the High Court of Justice, decision, termed as the Tar-
geted Killing case. 39 The Court applied the human rights law principle of preferring 
arrest over killing as "the means that should be employed" even when the "target" 
is someone taking a direct part in hostilities.40The position that a civilian cannot be 
attacked at such time as he or she is taking part in hostilities "ifless harmful means 
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can be employed" is held to be based on "internal laW' of the StateY The rule is 
not an absolute as its application is linked to the degree of control exercised by the 
military. Further, specific reference is made to the possibility that the option of ar-
rest may not exist at all where "at times it involves a risk so great to the lives of the 
soldiers. "42 
The application of this case may be somewhat limited by the specific situation 
regarding occupation facing Israeli authorities. Further, it is not dear how it would 
be applied in a struggle against organized armed groups in a more traditional con-
fli ct setting. Perhaps the most interesting aspect of this "blended" approach is that, 
notwithstanding the reliance on human rights law, there remains substantial reso-
nance with humanitarian law. For example, it is possible to contemplate a scenario 
in a built-up urban area controlled by the security forces where an attempt to neu-
tralize relatively low-level insurgents could lead to a detennination that even under 
the humanitarian law principle of proportionality (i.e., taking "all feasible precau-
tions in the choice of means and methods of attack with a view to avoiding, and in 
any event to minimizing, incidental loss of civilian life, injUly to civilians and dam-
age to civilian objects"43) the result would be a decision to capture rather than kill an 
opponent. 
In the conduct of coalition operations there is the potential for considerable 
misunderstanding among the "partners." One such issue that immediately strikes 
me is the Canadian approach to the use of force in the defense of property. Put 
simply, the use of deadly force to defend property generally is not permitted. This 
arose out of the "Somalia Affair," where Canadian troops fired on Somalis who 
ran away when discovered attempting to breach the wire to steal property. As I 
once explained to one of our soldiers, we do not permit the killing of people for 
stealing a watch even if it is right off your arm. However, we have, for operations 
short of armed conflict, provided greater authority to use force to protect desig-
nated mission-essential property. In respect to combat operations, the use of force 
is largely governed by the laws governing armed conflict, which permit the use of 
force to destroy and defend property under appropriate circumstances. Indeed, 
our rules of engagement have been quite robust throughout the conduct of opera-
tions since 200 1. 
Finally, I want to briefly address investigations in a coalition environment. This 
is taking up an increasing amount of commander and legal officer time in an oper-
ating environment that demands greater accountability. It has reached the point 
where additional training is provided for Canadian legal officers in this area. From 
a Canadian perspective this has included '"'blue-on-blue" engagements. One exam-
pie is the friendly fire incident of April 17,2002 at Tarnak Fann where a US Air 
Force F-16 mistakenly killed four and wounded eight Canadian soldiers. In 
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September 2006 there was a tragic incident in which a US A-IO Warthog called in 
to provide dose air support for a Canadian infantry company in Afghanistan killed 
one soldier and wounded thirty. There was a further incident at Forward Oper-
ating Base Robinson in Afghanistan where both a US and a Canadian soldier were 
killed during a firefight. That case is being investigated as a possible "blue-on-blue" 
incident. In each case, the cooperation between US and Canadian authorities has, 
from my perspective, been exceptional. The air incidents have involved both joint 
US-Canada investigations (Canadian-American copresidents) and Canadian na-
tional inquiries. While the most recent investigations are still being finalized, it is 
dear that this cooperative effort has had a positive effect so far on interoperability, 
as well as public perception. 
In summary, coalition operations present challenges, but none of them to date 
have been true "show stoppers. " As a general comment, it would appear that one of 
the strengths of international law and treaties, such as the Geneva Conventions, is 
that they provide a common reference for all participants. As nations committed to 
the rule of law, this common understanding, even when impacted by national in-
terpretations, has held all our countries in good stead. It does not mean that there 
will be no differences, however; the threats we face are global, which in turn de-
mand international cooperation. 
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